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Abstract: Agency theory infers that investors will incur cost to make alignment on 
principal-agent interest. A critic, however, has pointed out that the conflict of interest 
between principal and agent is not the only cause for agency cost. Cultural context 
(Johnson & Droege, 2004) and legal system (La Porta, et al., 2000) are also found 
as contributing factors. This study is to empirically investigate how board size, board 
independency, audit committee size and audit committee independency affect the 
earnings quality in the context of low or high level agency cost country according to 
Transparency International’s corruption level and Hofstede’s cultural values. 538 
firm-year across 6 South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) are observed in this research. Five Different accrual 
models (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, Detecting Earnings Management, 
1995; Kasznik, 1999; Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, Earnings management and costs 
to investors from firms meeting or slightly exceeding benchmarks, 2002; Dechow 
& Dichev, The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual Estimation 
Errors, 2002) are used to generate abnormal accruals which will be used as proxy for 
earnings management while to generate suitable factors from corporate governance 
variables, principal component analysis (PCA) is employed. Results indicate that (1) 
earnings management is efficient; (2) size and independency of Board of Director and 
audit committee are effective in reducing earnings management behaviour; (3) the 
management of firms operating in higher agency cost context will take advantage from 
the structure of corporate governance (size and independency of Board of Directors 
and audit committee) to conduct earnings management. Additionally, it is also found 
that bigger size (higher leverage) firms perform less (more) accounting discretion 
compared to their counterparts.
Key words:  corporate governance; earnings management; South East 
countries; accrual model; principal component analysis (PCA)
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INTRODUCTION
According to general theory of agency, 
it is predictable that investors will incur 
cost to make managers operate for 
maximisation of firm’s value because 
interests between agents and principal 
are different (agency conflict). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that it is 
impossible for agents to operate at 
absolutely no cost in order to maximise 
principal’s wealth. Managers implicitly 
require stimulus from shareholders to 
assure that each action taken in a firm is 
consistent with maximising company’s 
value.
However, critic has pointed out 
that social life also considers about 
relationship, legal/political environment 
and other social constructs. Therefore, 
the principal-agent conflict is not the 
only determinant for agency cost. 
Empirically, it is found that preference 
toward risk (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & 
Reilly, 1996; Ghosh & John, 2000) and 
cross-culture differences that distinguish 
understanding of compensation between 
US and European societies (Pennings, 
1993) influence the agency cost. 
Considering that, studies of correlation 
between cultural contexts (Johnson & 
Droege, 2004) or legal system (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000) and agency costs are immensely 
relevant. To know the correlation will be 
useful to understand the circumstances 
embedding agency costs which in turn 
help various stakeholders, with various 
interests, to take proper actions across 
countries.
Furthermore, the correlation of 
agency cost and cultural context and legal 
system will be useful to answer concerns 
of corporate governance in specific 
nationality (Judge, 2012). In emerging 
countries, the ownership tends to be 
concentrated and the conflicts mostly 
are between principal and principal 
i.e. between majority and minority 
shareholder. This is different from UK 
and US context. Young, et al. (Corporate 
Governance in Emerging Economies: 
A Review of the Principal–Principal 
Perspective, 2008) pointed out principal-
principal modus operandi that causes 
conflict such as signing in the unqualified 
relatives or cronies to urgent positions 
and conducting abuse of company asset 
and resource. Therefore, studies of 
corporate governance in countries with 
certain level of agency costs are worth of 
conduct because agency costs embedded 
from cultural values and legal systems 
vary across countries. The correlation 
of earnings quality and corporate 
governance whether the agency cost is 
higher or lower will be useful for various 
stakeholders.
Thus, this study scrutinises the 
cultural and corruption level differences 
across South-East Asian (SEA) countries 
affecting earnings management. This 
study is intended to contribute to the 
existing literature by examining how 
differences in culture and corruption 
may affect the agent behaviours in 
smoothing earnings. This is due to the 
fact that the correlation between earnings 
management and agency cost are still 
controversial. In one hand, it is argued 
that earnings management and agency 
cost are negatively correlated. In the 
context of low agency cost, managers may 
do earnings smoothing to predict future 
performance and to signal the market 
about the current performance (Arya, 
Glover, & Sunder, 2003). Shareholders, 
in this condition, support their agent to 
conduct such action. On the other hand, 
it is contended that managers in firm 
with high agency costs are more likely to 
do misconduct that detrimentally affects 
stakeholders (Healy & Wahlen, A Review 
of the Earnings Management Literature 
and Its Implications for Standard 
Setting, 1999). Concealing information 
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and deciding less conservative 
accounting report are opportunistic 
behaviours that could risk the value of 
firm (Healy & Palepu, 1993). Risks such 
as low credibility of financial statement 
(Ragan, 1998) and get sued by external 
stakeholders for reporting deceitful 
information are indeed undeniable. 
The second phase of this study 
investigates the correlation of corporate 
governance and earnings quality and 
their correlation when agency cost level 
(lower/higher) is taken into account. 
Four corporate governance variables 
identified in this study are size of board 
directors, independency of board 
directors, size of audit committee, and 
independency of audit committee.
Existing literatures mostly focus 
on East Asia (EA) not SEA countries 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Fan 
& Wong, 2002). Instead of EA countries, 
this study focuses on SEA countries 
because there are huge differences 
between EA and SEA countries. Even 
though SEA is a part of EA, they vary on 
geographical area, economic cooperation 
of Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and more importantly 
in terms of cultural values and corruption 
index. EA countries that are not included 
in SEA (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong) are perceived cleaner in 
public governance than SEA countries in 
2015 (Transparency International, 2015). 
Also, cultural values of collectivism and 
power distance are generally higher in 
SEA countries rather than the rest of EA 
countries (Culture Compass, 2010).
538 firm-year observations of the 
30 biggest market capitalisations in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam from 
2012 to 2015 are used in this research. 
The level of agency cost of each country 
is ranked based on corruption perception 
index obtained from Transparency 
International and cultural values from 
Hofstede Centre. Author employs five 
different accrual models across countries 
and predict error term as abnormal 
accruals. Two types of regression are 
used when running accrual models 
namely fixed effect model (FEM) and 
pooled panel data model. The absolute 
abnormal accruals are set as proxy of 
earnings management. Moreover, to 
generate suitable factors from corporate 
governance variables, principal 
component analysis (PCA) is employed. 
Then, using linear regression, author 
scrutinises the correlation between 
abnormal accruals and (1) high agency 
cost country, (2) corporate governance 
factors and (3) interaction of high agency 
cost country and corporate governance 
factors.
Results indicate that (1) earnings 
management is efficient, (2) indeed 
independency and size of board 
directors and audit committees are 
effective reducing earnings management 
behaviour and (3) firms in countries 
with higher agency cost level will 
take advantage corporate governance 
structure (size and independency of 
board directors and audit committees) 
to conduct earnings management. 
Furthermore, I also find that firms with 
bigger size (higher leverage) perform less 
(more) accounting discretion rather than 
its counterparts. This result is robust 
to different specifications of different 
models of generating abnormal accruals.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Investors generally are in favour 
towards legal mechanism for (1) 
protection of their property from 
expropriation, (2) high probability of 
claiming contracts, (3) calling for a 
meeting with management if there is a 
significant concern, and (4) cleanliness 
of public governance to avoid extra 
undesirable costs (Larcker & Tayan, 
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2011).  Additionally, in the condition of 
market and firm control system are poor, 
they still may benefit from government’s 
intervention to overcome agency problem 
(Jensen, 2005), and to even improve 
economic condition (Nguyen & van Dijk, 
2012). However, Larcker and Tayan 
(2011) argue that public governance with 
so-called interventions does not work 
properly (i.e. in protecting property 
rights) if corruption is perceived high. 
It is empirically evidenced that there 
is a significant inter-relationship and 
correlation between corruption and legal 
ineffectiveness (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003) 
(Fisman & Miguel, 2007). Therefore, 
higher corruption level can be a measure 
to predict a country having ineffective 
legal system and lack investor protection 
implying higher agency cost.
Culture values in a country deliberately 
influences firms’ activity. These values 
also define particular priorities and 
ambitions of firms (Schwartz, 1999). 
Culture defines whether firms, as a 
structural part of society, are doing the 
correct operation in businesses or not. 
Countries across the world are culturally 
different. Hofstede (1980) developed 
national cultural dimensions. 
Power distance portrays how 
unequal the distribution of power 
between leaders and workers within 
an institution. In countries with high 
score of power distance, the agency 
cost is perceived lower because social 
stratification is permissible and well-
practiced. Consequently, it is effortless 
to align incentives of management and 
shareholders. In contrast, low power 
distance countries require normative 
means e.g. outcome compensation to 
align agents and principal’s incentives 
(Johnson & Droege, 2004). Empirically, 
low power distance is significantly 
correlated with higher dividend pay-outs 
(Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010). Therefore, it 
can be hypothesized that lower power 
distance is a sign of high agency cost.
Another cultural dimension is 
tendency to avoid uncertainty which 
indicate how tolerance a society is for 
ambiguous situations, unknown future 
occasions, and unpredictable behaviour 
and thoughts (Hofstede, 1980). It is 
argued that civilians with high uncertainty 
avoidance are more risk averse so they 
require higher rewards (e.g. higher 
discount rate or dividend pay-out ratio). 
Johnson and Droege (2004) propose 
that gain potential should overweigh the 
loss potential in the context of society 
with high avoidance of uncertainty. 
However, this idea is not always the 
case because a lower dividend pay-out 
ratio given by a firm is a sign of high 
predictability and stability. Research has 
been done supporting this idea that high 
uncertainty avoidance is correlated with 
high cash flow holding or low dividend 
pay-out ratio (Ramírez & Tadesse, 2009; 
Chang & Noorbakhsh, 2009; Fidrmuc 
& Jacob, 2010). Thus, it is justifiable to 
consider high uncertainty avoidance as 
indicator of low agency cost.
Individualism is also an important 
dimension implying that an individual 
only concerns about himself and, if 
any, the closest colleagues (Hofstede, 
1980). Not surprising that agency theory 
empirical studies are found massively 
in western-countries (Johnson & 
Droege, 2004) because what drives this 
opportunistic-prospecting behaviour is 
claimed to be individualism as the main 
value of western culture. This is consistent 
with Fidrmuc & Jacob (2010) proposing 
idea that the agency cost of companies is 
higher in high individualism countries. 
In contrast, collectivist countries, mostly 
found in Eastern part of the world, are 
considered as countries with value that 
can align principal-agency interests. 
Thus, it can be assumed that high 
individualism contributes to high agency 
cost.
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Lastly, Hofstede and Minkov 
(2010) developed new perspective of 
cultural dimension which is long-term 
orientation characterised by future-
oriented, avoiding risk, maintaining 
current behaviour and perpetuating 
specific & innovative leadership. This is 
also a relevant culture dimension in this 
case. Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) 
proved that firms operating in a higher 
long-term orientation country tend to 
retain more cash. Investors in long-
term oriented culture are dependent on 
long-term profitability (e.g. maintaining 
the business performance is more 
preferable than taking high risk projects) 
or non-economic achievement (e.g. 
sustainability of worker) when they 
look for investment opportunity. Hence, 
this paper hypotheses high long-term 
orientation as a signal of low agency cost.
This study is to analyse the correlation 
between agency cost (based in cultural 
values and corruption level) and 
earnings management. Teoh, et al. 
(1998) find that earnings management 
is opportunistic. This detrimentally 
affect the principal as agents tend to 
choose reporting mechanism that may 
benefit their own interest (Healy & 
Palepu, 1993). Discretion may result in 
low credibility of financial statements 
hence arising of difficulty for external 
source of fund (Ragan, 1998). However, 
Arya, et al. (2003) contend that earnings 
management can be the similar form of 
interest between managers and agents. By 
doing earnings management, managers 
– by communication with expertise 
and high motivation of successful 
performance – may “improve” the firms’ 
value and give the best prediction for 
future performance which is consistent 
with principal interest. Therefore, 
agency cost and earnings management 
are negatively correlated. Jiraporn, et 
al. (2008) and Subramanyam (1996) 
support this idea.
H1. Earnings quality is lower for firms 
in lower agency cost countries.
Corporate governance structures will 
be elaborated as the second phase of 
this study whether they are correlated 
with earnings discretion. Also, this 
study is to investigate the correlation of 
earnings management and interaction of 
corporate governance and high agency 
cost countries. There are four corporate 
governance variables studied in this 
study. Board of directors are liable in 
advisory and oversight (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011). Advisory role is the place of 
management to consult of strategic and 
operational directions while oversight 
role which covers monitoring power 
over management being at shareholders’ 
interest. Such an important duty is 
hiring/firing CEO. Research showed that 
board size and meeting have correlation 
to firms’ performance (Guest, 2009; 
Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Stefan, & 
Wells, 1998). Empirically, studies in New 
Zealand (Ahmed, Hossain, & Adams, 
2006) and US (Vafeas, 2005) found 
that board size has negative correlation 
with earnings quality. Different studies 
found that board size is insignificantly 
correlated with earnings timeliness 
(Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004) 
while other found positive correlation 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
1999). Therefore, this study is firstly to 
investigate the size of board of directors 
in its correlation with earnings quality. 
Board independence is also relevant 
having incentives such as maintaining 
reputation. Proven by research, 
independent boards work on-behalf 
of shareholders (Brickley, Coles, & 
Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992). 
Empirically in Hong Kong (Jaggi, Leung, 
& Gul, 2009) and in US (Xie, Davidson 
III, & DaDalt, 2003; Klein, 2002) 
studies found that independence board 
is positively correlated with earnings 
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estimation of accruals is different in such 
industry leaving this study with 148 firms 
to survey therefore there are 538 firm-
year observations in this study. Financial 
data is collected from Worldscope 
database using US dollar currency 
rate as measurement for consistency 
while corruption perception index 
(CPI) is obtained from Transparency 
International and cultural values from 
Hofstede Centre.
Firstly, the agency scores are 
predicted as ranging from 0-100 based 
on country-specific measure: cultural 
values and CPI scores. Since the score 
of cultures and CPI are also ranging 
from 0-100, it is unnecessarily to rescale 
the measurement. Power distance, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
long-term orientation and CPI are 
assumed to have correlation with agency 
costs as discussed in literature review 
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Assumed Correlation of 
Country-Specific Measures with Agency 
Cost
Then, countries are raked based on 
this total agency cost score. I define the 
first, second, and third rank countries as 
countries having high agency cost and 
lower rank countries (4th, 5th and 6th) 
as countries with low agency cost (see 
Figure 2).
quality. Thus, board independence is the 
second variable of corporate governance 
of this study. 
Lastly, audit committee is in charge 
of preventing audit fraud of firms 
overseeing the hiring, performance, and 
independence of external auditor chosen 
by management. Additionally, it is also 
supervising performance of internal 
audit function. Audit committee size 
and percentage of independent audit 
committee are factors that contribute to 
the high quality of audit committee. It is 
empirically evidenced that the percentage 
of independent audit committee is found 
to be negatively correlated with internal 
control problems (Krishnan, 2005). It is 
because independent audit committees 
are at the interest of protecting 
reputation and credibility of company by 
finding error in internal audit function 
in the company. Similarly, previous 
literatures find a negative correlation 
between percentage of audit committee 
independence and abnormal accruals in 
US (Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson III, & 
DaDalt, 2003; Vafeas, 2005). The size 
and independence of audit committee are 
the third and fourth variable of corporate 
governance in this study respectively.
H2. There is a significant correlation 
between corporate governance factors 
and earnings quality.
H3. The correlation between corporate 
governance factors and earnings quality 
is stronger or weaker for firms in high 
level of agency cost countries.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research collects 180 firms 
sample from the 30 biggest market 
capitalisations in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam for 2012-2015. It excludes 
32 firms in financial sector since the 
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After that, using across countries 
regression, the earnings quality will be 
generated based on five accrual models 
below:
1. Jones (Jones, 1991)
ACCit = β0 + β1 ∆REVit + β2 PPEit + εit
2. Dechow, et al. (Detecting Earnings 
Management, 1995)
ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 
PPEit + εit
3. Kasznik (On the Association between 
Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings 
Management, 1999)
ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 
PPEit + β3 ∆CFOit + εit
4. Dechow, et al. (Earnings management 
and costs to investors from firms 
meeting or slightly exceeding 
benchmarks, 2002)
ACCit =  β0 + β1 (∆REVit – (1 – 
k) ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + β3 ACCit-1 + 
 β4 ∆REVit+1 + εit
5.  Dechow & Dichev  (The Quality of 
Accruals and Earnings: The Role of 
Accrual Estimation Errors, 2002) 
ACCit =  β0 + β1 CFOit-1 + β2 CFOit 
+ β3 CFOit+1 + β4 (∆REVit - ∆RECit) + 
 β5 PPEit + εit
where:
ACC =  Total net income minus net cash 
flow operational divided by total 
asset current year
∆REV  = Net turnover at time t minus 
turnover at time t-1 of a company 
divided by total asset current year
∆REC  =Net receivables at time t 
minus receivables at time t-1 of a 
company divided by total current last 
year
PPE = Net property, plant, and 
equipment of a company divided by 
total asset current year
CFO= Net cash flow operational of 
a company divided by total asset 
current year
∆CFO = Net cash flow operational 
at time t minus net cash flow 
operational at time t-1 of a company 
divided by total asset current year
K = Slope coefficient from regression 
ΔREC on ΔREV
However, given that Model 4 and 5 
include future year variables i.e. ∆REVit+1 
and CFOit+1 hence this study applies 
Model 1-3 in main analysis and Model 4 
Figure 2 Calculating Agency Cost Level of SEA Countries
Country
Agency Cost Score Agency 
Cost 
LevelPDI IDV UAI LTO CPI Total Rank
Indonesia 22 14 52 38 66.50 192.50 5th Low
Malaysia 0 26 64 59 49.75 198.75 4th Low
Philippines 6 32 56 73 64.25 231.25 2nd High
Singapore 26 20 92 28 14.50 180.50 6th Low
Thailand 36 20 36 68 63.00 223.00 3rd High
Vietnam 30 20 70 43 69.00 232.00 1st High
Average Score of Low 16 20 69.33 41.67 43.58 190.58
Average Score of High 24 24 54 61.33 65.42 228.75
Notes: PDI = power distance index, IDV = individualism value, UAI = uncertainty avoidance index, 
LTO = long term orientation, CPI = corruption perception index.
149
Andi Manggala Putra, Hermita Arif
and 5 in sensitivity analysis. Moreover, it 
is anticipated that heterogeneity problem 
may exist in the model because of repeated 
values in variables of similar group i.e. 
either firm, country, etc. Thus fixed 
effects model (FEM) will be considerably 
suitable to run regression because FEM 
solves all heterogeneity effects that are 
correlated with regressors. Therefore, 
two different regression models are used 
for each accrual model namely: fixed 
effect model (FEM) and pooled panel data 
model across countries. In case of pooled 
model across countries, year effect has to 
be controlled so cluster standard error 
for firm is necessary. Absolute abnormal 
accruals are used because both income-
increasing and decreasing discretion 
are forms of accounting manipulation 
symmetrically (Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 
2005).
Subsequently, instead of using 
arbitrary indicator(s) that could lead to 
bias coefficient estimates, this research 
use all corporate governance variables 
discussed earlier in literature review. 
Following Larcker, et al. (2007), author 
employs principal component analysis 
(PCA) amongst four different corporate 
governance variables to get suitable 
factors for linear regression. This method 
is chosen because it is suspected that 
there is a correlation between corporate 
governance variables that can arise 
multicollinearity problem in linear OLS 
regression. After generating suitable 
factors for regression, linear regression 
is run below to know the correlation 
between abnormal accruals and (1) 
high agency cost country, (2) corporate 
governance factors and (3) interaction of 
high agency cost country and corporate 
governance factors. I include year 
dummies and cluster standard error 
for firms. Also, author use size (Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993), book-to-market 
ratio (McNichols, 2000) and leverage 
ratio (Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005) 
as controls because those variables are 
associated with manager’s behaviour.
|DACC|it = α0 + α1 HIGHit + ∑ γ 
Corporate Governance Factorsit +  
∑ θ HIGH * Corporate Governance 
Factorsit +  δ1 SIZEit + δ2 BTMit + δ3 LEVit 
+ εit
where:
|DACC|= Absolute of discretionary 
accruals from accrual model 
divided by total asset current year
HIGH = One if firm is operating in high 
agency cost country and zero 
otherwise
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total asset 
divided by total asset current year
BTM = Debt-to-equity ratio of a 
company at current year
LEV = Book value divided by market 
value of a company at current 
year Corporate Governance 
Factor =  Corporate governance 
factors generated from PCA 
analysis
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Principal Component Analysis
Table 1 presents the descriptive of 
corporate governance variables and its 
correlation matrix, and it shows that at 
least auditor independency and board 
independency are correlated.
Table 1 Descriptive of Corporate 
Governance Variables
Note: BOD = number of board directors employed in a company; 
BOD_IND = percentage of independent board director employed in a 
company; AUD = number of audit committee employed in a company; 
AUD_IND = percentage of independent audit committee employed in 
a company
150
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
Vol. 1 No. 2 (142-160)
Table 2 presents the result of principal 
component analysis of corporate 
governance variables. It was testified 
whether factor analysis is appropriate 
using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test 
statistic and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
Value of KMO shows 0.562 and p-value 
of Bartlett’s test reports 0.000. This 
means factor analysis is appropriate. 
Then, following Larcker, et al. (2007) 
this paper is using principal component 
analysis to determine the minimum 
number of factors that account the 
maximum variance of data. Based on 
communalities values, each governance 
variables are suitable for factor analysis 
because it exceeds 0.50. All factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 are retained, 
and it results 2 factors explaining 72.68% 
variance of the data. This number is also 
suitable after passing criteria of scree 
plot test. Varimax rotation is used for 
easy interpretation of outcomes of which 
governance variable belongs to which 
factor. Governance variables are defined 
to each factor exceeding 0.40 in absolute 
value. 1
Therefore, author determines two 
factors of INDEPENDENCY and BOARD 
SIZE. INDEPENDENCY contains 
information of percentage of independent 
board directors and percentage of 
independent audit committee while 
BOARD SIZE associates with size of board 
directors and size of audit committee.
1  Factors used in this study are the most proper one. Be-
forehand, I include board meeting governance variable 
in PCA analysis and I found that this variable cannot 
be included in all factors hence I include it as regressor 
in further regression. Then, multicollinearity exists 
in the regression model so I decide to exclude that 
variable in this study.
Table 2 Result of Principal Component 
Analysis
FACTOR
COMPO-
NENT LOAD-
ING
COMMU-
NALITIES
INDEPENDEN-
CY
   BOD_IND 0.8930 0.8060
   AUD_IND 0.8050 0.7260
BOARD SIZE
   BOD 0.9020 0.8200
   AUD 0.6100 0.5550
KMO Measure 
of Sampling 
Adequacy
0.5620
Sig. of Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphe-
ricity
0.0000
Cumulative 
Data Variance 
Explained
72.68%
Note: Factors are used with eigenvalue is more 
than 1. Variables belong to a factor where the 
component loading overweighs 0.40. All vari-
ables are defined in Table 1.
Multivariate Analysis
This section is reporting the 
multivariate analysis designed to test 
the hypotheses of this study whether 
discretionary accruals are associated 
with (1) high agency cost country, (2) 
corporate governance factors and (3) 
interaction of high agency cost country 
and corporate governance factor.
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics 
of variables for five accrual models. This 
table presents mean and median values 
of firm-year observations variables 
that are used for accrual regression. 
Author is using FEM and pooled panel 
data regressions for accrual models, 
and then include year dummy and 
cluster standard error for firm in pooled 
regression across countries.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of 
Abnormal Accrual Measurements, 
Corporate Governance and Interaction 
of Corporate Governance and High 
Dummy, Control and High Agency Cost 
Dummy Variables
Note: ACC = total net income minus net cash flow operational divided by total asset current year; ∆REV = net turnover at time t 
minus turnover at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year; ∆REC = net receivables at time t minus receivables 
at time t-1 of a company divided by total current last year PPE = net property, plant, and equipment of a company divided by 
total asset current year; CFO = net cash flow operational of a company divided by total asset current year; ∆CFO = net cash flow 
operational at time t minus net cash flow operational at time t-1 of a company divided by total asset current year; K = slope co-
efficient from regression ΔREC on ΔREV.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Five Accrual Models
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from 
FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| 
= absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel across 
countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating 
in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPEN-
DENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the 
independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of 
corporate governance that describes the size of board direc-
tors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided 
by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a 
company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market 
value of a company at current year.
Model 1:  ACCit = β0 + β1 ∆REVit + β2 PPEit + εit – Jones 
(Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, 
1991)
Model 2:  ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + εit 
– Dechow, et al. (Detecting Earnings Management, 1995)
Model 3:  ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + β3 
∆CFOit + εit – Kasznik (On the Association between Voluntary 
Disclosure and Earnings Management, 1999)
152
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
Vol. 1 No. 2 (142-160)
After running accrual models, error 
terms for each model-regression is 
predicted and use them as proxy of 
abnormal accruals. Absolute abnormal 
accruals are plotted as proxy of earnings 
management because both income-
increasing and income-decreasing are 
forms of accounting manipulation. 
Absolute abnormal accruals are obtained 
from Model 1-3 in main analysis and from 
Model 4 and 5 in sensitivity analysis. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics 
of variables for further regressions. Total 
sample is 538 firm-year observations 
consisting firm-year observations in low 
agency countries (HIGH = 0; n = 293) and 
those operating in high agency countries 
(HIGH = 1; n = 245), see Panel C. Panel 
A describes the different measurements 
of abnormal accruals generated as 
dependent variables. Panel B reports 
the descriptive of corporate governance 
factors and its interactions to be included 
in the model to answer hypothesis H2 
and H3. I run linear regression of high 
dummy, corporate governance factors, 
interaction of high dummy and corporate 
governance factors, and control variables 
on different types of absolute abnormal 
accruals measurements. Author include 
year dummy and cluster standard error 
for firm for each regression.
|DACC|it = α0 + α1 HIGHit 
+ γ1 INDEPENDENCYit 
+ γ2 BOARD SIZEit + θ1 
H I G H * I N D E P E N D E N C Y i t 
+ θ2 HIGH*BOARD SIZEit + 
δ1 SIZEit + δ2 BTMit + δ3 LEVit + εit
Table 5 presents the pairwise 
correlation of variables. It appears that 
BOARD SIZE and HIGH have negative 
correlation with abnormal accruals. Also, 
it appears that SIZE and BTM (LEV) 
are negatively (positively) correlated 
with abnormal accruals. These can be 
evidences to support hypothesis H1 and 
H2; however, these correlations should 
be interpreted with caution because firm’s 
characteristics should be controlled in 
cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, the 
table shows that VIFs are all below 10 
indicating that the model does not have 
multicollinearity problem.
Table 5 Pairwise Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 VIF
1
FEM_|DACC|  
   Model 1
1.000
2
FEM_|DACC|
   Model 2
1.000* 1.000
3
FEM_|DACC|
   Model 3
0.806* 0.806* 1.000
4
POOLED_|DACC|
   Model 1
0.956* 0.958* 0.753* 1.000
5
POOLED_|DACC|
   Model 2
0.954* 0.957* 0.752* 1.000* 1.000
6
POOLED_|DACC|
   Model 3
0.782* 0.784* 0.942* 0.809* 0.808* 1.000
7 INDEPENDENCY -0.026 -0.026 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 1.000 4.47
8 BOARD SIZE -0.123* -0.123* -0.072 -0.105* -0.104* -0.067 0.000 1.000 4.14
9
HIGH * 
   INDEPENDENCY
-0.004 -0.003 0.023 0.008 0.009 0.025 0.811* 0.282* 1.000 3.89
10
HIGH *
   BOARD SIZE
-0.062 -0.062 -0.031 -0.047 -0.047 -0.037 0.250* 0.794* 0.414* 1.000 3.59
11 SIZE -0.179* -0.177* -0.115* -0.154* -0.152* -0.093* 0.308* 0.476* 0.406* 0.388* 1.000 1.77
12 BTM -0.114* -0.113* -0.096* -0.097* -0.096* -0.066 -0.195* -0.093* -0.221* -0.145* 0.172* 1.000 1.23
13 LEV 0.054 0.055 0.097* 0.062 0.064 0.105* -0.150* 0.257* -0.049 0.179* 0.115* -0.066 1.000 1.13
14 HIGH -0.075 -0.077 -0.094* -0.109* -0.109* -0.137* -0.577* 0.199* -0.455* 0.139* -0.172* 0.068 0.215* 1.000 1.79
Note: All variables are defined in Table 4. * significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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Table 6-8 report the regression result 
of analysis designed to test the correlation 
between abnormal accruals and (1) 
high agency cost country, (2) corporate 
governance factors and (3) interaction of 
high agency cost country and corporate 
governance factors. 
Table 6 Regression Result - 
Independent Variables from Abnormal 
Accrual Measurements of Model 1
Table 6 specifically reports 
regression analysis using two different 
measurement of absolute abnormal 
accruals from Model 1 of Jones (1991) 
using FEM and pooled panel data 
regressions. It shows that HIGH, 
INDEPENDENCY, and BOARD SIZE 
are negatively correlated with abnormal 
accruals. HIGH * INDEPENDENCY 
and HIGH * BOARD SIZE are positively 
correlated with abnormal accruals. 
Also, it depicts that SIZE has negative 
correlation with abnormal accruals. 
This supports hypothesis H1 that firms 
in low agency cost countries have 
higher abnormal accruals. This also 
shows that independency and size of 
board directors and audit committee 
are effectively reducing earnings 
management effort. However, evidences 
depict that firms in high agency cost 
countries take advantages of corporate 
governance structure to conduct 
earnings management. Furthermore, 
results identify that bigger firms tend to 
do earnings management rather than its 
counterparts.
Table 7 reports result of regression 
analysis using two different 
measurement of absolute abnormal 
accruals from Model 2 of Dechow, et 
al. (1995) using FEM and pooled panel 
data regressions. It describes that HIGH, 
INDEPENDENCY, and BOARD SIZE 
are negatively correlated with abnormal 
accruals. HIGH * INDEPENDENCY 
and HIGH * BOARD SIZE are positively 
correlated with abnormal accruals. 
Also, it depicts that SIZE has negative 
correlation with abnormal accruals. 
These results are similar with Table 6 
beforehand generates.
Table 7 Regression Result - 
Independent Variables from Abnormal 
Accrual Measurements of Model 2
 MODEL 
2 
(N=538)
FEM_|DACC| POOLED_|DACC|
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
HIGH -0.0128 ** -2.16 -0.0167 *** -2.95
INDE-
PEN-
DENCY
-0.0101 ** -2.35 -0.0108 ** -2.38
BOARD 
SIZE
-0.0092 ** -2.41 -0.0087 ** -2.33
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accru-
als from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; 
POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals 
from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total 
asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency 
cost country and zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = 
factor of corporate governance that describes the in-
dependency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = fac-
tor of corporate governance that describes the size of 
board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of 
total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = 
debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV 
= book value divided by market value of a company at 
current year.
Model 1:  ACCit = β0 + β1 ∆REVit + β2 PPEit + εit   –  
Jones (Earnings Management During Import Relief 
Investigations, 1991)
 *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * 
significant 10% level
154
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
Vol. 1 No. 2 (142-160)
HIGH * 
INDE-
PEN-
DENCY
0.0103 * 1.93 0.0099 * 1.87
HIGH * 
BOARD 
SIZE
0.0084 ** 1.99 0.0091 ** 2.23
SIZE -0.0048 * -1.94 -0.0045 * -1.88
BTM -0.0058 -1.41 -0.0042 -0.96
LEV 0.0048 1.33 0.0053 1.48
CON-
STANT
0.1242 *** 3.29 0.1189 *** 3.24
F-STAT 2.99 2.96
PROB > F 0.0014 0.0015
R2  0.0871  0.0887
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across 
countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discre-
tionary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total as-
set; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and 
zero otherwise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that 
describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor 
of corporate governance that describes the size of board directors em-
ployed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset 
current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; 
LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year.
Model 2:  ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + εit – Dechow , 
et al. (Detecting Earnings Management, 1995)
 *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 10% 
level
Table 8 reports regression analysis 
using two different measurement of 
abnormal accruals from Model 3 of 
Kasznik (1999) using FEM and pooled 
panel data regressions. It describes 
that HIGH, INDEPENDENCY, and 
BOARD SIZE are negatively correlated 
with abnormal accruals. HIGH * 
INDEPENDENCY is positively correlated 
with abnormal accruals. Also, it depicts 
that LEV has positive correlation with 
abnormal accruals. These findings 
are similar with what previous results 
generate. However, evidences depict 
that firms in high agency cost countries 
take advantages of corporate governance 
only with independent board structure 
to conduct earnings management. 
Furthermore, results identify that firms 
with higher leverage conduct more 
earnings management behaviour than its 
counterparts.
Table 8 Regression Result - 
Independent Variables from Abnormal 
Accrual Measurements of Model 3
Overall, it can be concluded that (1) 
firms in high agency cost level have 
higher earnings quality rather than its 
counterparts, (2) independency and size 
of board directors and audit committees 
are negatively correlated with 
abnormal accruals (3) the correlation of 
independency or size (of board directors 
and audit committees) and abnormal 
accruals is stronger for firms operating 
in high agency cost countries. This 
shows that (1) earnings management 
is efficient (2) indeed independency 
and size of board directors and audit 
committees are effective reducing 
earnings management behaviour and 
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from 
FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|-
DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from pooled panel 
across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is 
operating in high agency cost country and zero otherwise; 
INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that de-
scribes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = 
factor of corporate governance that describes the size of board 
directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset 
divided by total asset current year; BTM = debt-to-equity ra-
tio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by 
market value of a company at current year.
Model 3:  ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + β3 
∆CFOit + εit – Kasznik (On the Association between Volun-
tary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 1999)
 *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * signif-
icant 10% level
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(3) firms in countries with higher 
agency cost level will take advantage 
corporate governance structure (size and 
independency of board directors and 
audit committees) to conduct earnings 
management. Furthermore, this study 
also infers that firms with bigger size 
(bigger leverage) perform less (more) 
accounting discretion rather than its 
counterparts.
Sensitivity Analysis
This sub-section presents sensitivity 
analysis of previous regression analysis. 
Absolute abnormal accruals are 
employed as measurements using two 
alternative accrual models (Dechow, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2002; Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002). Because these models 
include future variables, 135 firm-
year observations (25.09%) of total 
sample before are dropped out from the 
analysis. Therefore, in this sensitivity 
analysis, there are 54.09% of firm-year 
observations operating in low agency 
cost countries (HIGH = 0; n = 218) and 
45.91% of those operating in high agency 
cost countries (HIGH = 1; n = 185). 
Author runs regression including year 
dummies and I cluster standard error for 
firms in all regressions.
Table 9 Regression Results of Sensitivity Analysis
 
FEM_|DACC| POOLED_|DACC|
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
MODEL 4 (N=403)
HIGH -0.0242 *** -3.13 -0.0114 ** -2.47
INDEPENDENCY -0.0149 *** -2.63 -0.0093 ** -2.49
BOARD SIZE -0.0113 ** -2.2 -0.0120 ** -2.39
HIGH * INDEPENDENCY 0.0112 1.62 0.0077 * 1.66
HIGH * BOARD SIZE 0.0135 ** 2.34 0.0150 *** 2.85
SIZE -0.0054 * -1.84 -0.0066 *** -3.61
BTM -0.0074 -1.32 -0.0011 -0.31
LEV 0.0069 1.5 0.0023 0.89
CONSTANT 0.1504 *** 3.34 0.1483 *** 5.31
F-STAT 2.69 5.23
PROB > F 0.0049 0.0000
R2 0.1019 0.1276
MODEL 5 (N=403)
HIGH -0.0132 * -1.72 -0.0151 *** -3.39
INDEPENDENCY -0.0093 * -1.96 -0.0091 *** -2.91
BOARD SIZE -0.0097 ** -2.25 -0.0075 *** -2.84
HIGH * INDEPENDENCY 0.0075 1.12 0.0060 1.45
HIGH * BOARD SIZE 0.0117 ** 2.37 0.0084 *** 2.88
SIZE -0.0062 -1.63 -0.0025 -1.2
BTM -0.0135 *** -2.92 -0.0064 * -1.88
LEV 0.0020 0.62 0.0041 ** 2.16
CONSTANT 0.1432 ** 2.29 0.0802 ** 2.43
F-STAT 1.85 2.57
PROB > F 0.0573 0.0069
R2 0.1345 0.1049
Note: FEM_|DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals from FEM across countries, scaled by total asset; POOLED_|DACC| = absolute discretion-
ary accruals from pooled panel across countries, scaled by total asset; HIGH = one if firm is operating in high agency cost country and zero other-
wise; INDEPENDENCY = factor of corporate governance that describes the independency of board directors; BOARD SIZE = factor of corporate 
governance that describes the size of board directors employed; SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset divided by total asset current year; BTM = 
debt-to-equity ratio of a company at current year; LEV = book value divided by market value of a company at current year.
Model 4:  ACCit = β0 + β1 (∆REVit – (1 – k) ∆RECit) + β2 PPEit + β3 ACCit-1 + β4 ∆REVit+1 + εit 
Model 5: ACCit = β0 + β1 CFOit-1 + β2 CFOit + β3 CFOit+1 + β4 (∆REVit - ∆RECit) + β5 PPEit + εit
 *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 10% level
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Table 9 shows the regression 
result of sensitivity analysis. Overall, 
evidences are consistent with main 
analysis. Results show that (1) firms 
in high agency cost level country have 
higher earnings quality rather than its 
counterparts, (2) independency and size 
of board directors and audit committees 
are negatively correlated with abnormal 
accruals and (3) the correlation between 
board independency (or board size) and 
abnormal accruals is stronger for firms 
operating in high agency cost countries. 
This confirms previous finding in main 
analysis that (1) earnings management 
is efficient (2) independency and board 
size factors are effective reducing 
earnings management behaviour and 
(3) firms in countries with higher 
agency cost level will take advantage 
of corporate governance structures 
(in case of independency and size of 
board directors and audit committees) 
to conduct earnings management. 
Furthermore, Sensitivity analysis result 
shows that size and book-to-market ratio 
(leverage) are negatively (positively) 
correlated with abnormal accruals. This 
means that bigger firms and under-
priced firms perform less for accounting 
discretion rather than its counterparts 
while firms with higher leverage conduct 
more earnings management than its 
counterparts.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study scrutinises the association 
between abnormal accruals and (1) 
high agency cost country, (2) corporate 
governance factors and (3) interaction of 
high agency cost country and corporate 
governance factor.
Evidences describe that (1) firms in high 
agency cost level have higher earnings 
quality rather than its counterparts, (2) 
firms with higher independency and size 
of board directors and audit committees 
are negatively correlated with 
abnormal accruals (3) the correlation of 
independency or size (of board directors 
and audit committees) and abnormal 
accruals is stronger for firms operating 
in high agency cost countries. This shows 
that (1) earnings management is efficient 
(2) indeed independency and size of 
board directors and audit committees are 
effective reducing earnings management 
behaviour and (3) firms in countries 
with higher agency cost level will 
take advantage corporate governance 
structure (size and independency of 
board directors and audit committees) 
to conduct earnings management. 
Furthermore, I also find that firms with 
bigger size (higher leverage) perform less 
(more) accounting discretion rather than 
its counterparts.
This finding contributes the existing 
literatures that typical earnings 
management in six SEA countries is 
efficient, e.g. in Indonesia (Siregar 
& Utama, 2008). This finding also 
contributes the general idea of existing 
literatures that audit committee and 
board director’s independencies are 
governance means that effectively 
reduce earnings management (Klein, 
2002). Also, evidence shows that size of 
board directors and audit committees 
is also effective to decrease earnings 
management which is not consistent with 
common view, but somehow similar with 
Larcker, et al. (2007). Lastly, there are 
enough evidences showing that corporate 
governance structure advantages can 
be an opportunistic driver for firms 
in countries with high agency cost to 
conduct earnings management.
Implication and Suggestion for 
Further Research
Based on results of this study, there 
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are several implications identified. First, 
standard setters should be more aware 
in governing and adjusting regulations 
based on cultural values and corruption 
level differences because they can 
affect the agency cost level as well as 
the earnings management behaviour. 
Second, investors may look forward to 
look at the earnings account for their 
investment decision.
There are also several limitations 
of this research that can be developed. 
First, financial and governance data 
is not generally available or complete, 
especially in country such as Vietnam. 
Second, the sample employed for further 
research should be extended into bigger 
sample (firm and year) or even the whole 
population. Third, model fit is still too 
low, so the model can be developed 
through adding governance variables, 
modifying and identifying other the 
variables, and looking for more suitable 
factors for future research.
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